Huh?

Gonzalez v. Police Com'r Bratton, 2000 WL 1191558 (S.D.N.Y)

Can anyone explain what this means??!!

"The law by its very nature records many matters that embody the perception, progression and maturation of external events. Legal disputes, requiring the analysis and cataloguing of what has occurred, then often demand an exercise of retrospection and reconstruction that brings to mind an image of a time-motion study. Its object is to focus by close-up on the precise moment that gives rise to rights and engenders corresponding duties to invoke them. This case calls for such a task. The various issues in contention here demand calibrated judgments about the interrelation of time and events: the moment in a continuum when fine lines of conduct fade from one form of action and ripen into another; when conduct of one person becomes sufficiently manifest and identifiable for what it is so as to give it a name, load it with legal meaning, and charge another person both with recognition of the act and a duty to respond formally to it; when, to the contrary, the realm of perception of things seen and felt may be misleading, by presenting, like the proverbial tip of the iceberg, an incomplete picture of a reality unknown to the beholder but possessing much larger mass and essence than the fragment of it that peers into view; and when the point arrives at which an act or omission by one person or group may by association and through imputation ripen into responsibility for actions in fact taken by another.”

His head was full of larceny but his feet were honest

Burris v. King, 588 F.Supp. 1152 (D. Colo. 1984)

This was a suit for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. It began with an argument at the 1981 winter meetings of the American Association of Professional Baseball Clubs. A baseball manager got into a name calling contest and threatened another manager with a Sprite bottle. Before getting into the facts, the court wrote an essay about baseball which was unrelated to the facts of the case, including this:

After a solid career, Dick Allen is most renowned for his comment: “If horses don't eat it, I don't want to play on it.” Dave Lemonds of the Chicago White Sox once said that playing on artificial turf “is like playing marbles in a bathtub.”

The facts of this case are that two managers got into an argument and one manager threatened the other with a Sprite bottle.

The pleadings and supporting affidavits clearly specify that the bottle was a Sprite bottle. They are unclear as to whether Burris' intended delivery was overhand, sidearm, or submarine style, or whether Burris was gripping the bottle properly, label side up. Had Burris gripped the bottle properly, so that he could read the label, it would have been difficult for King to see it as well. The propriety of Burris' grip, however, does not affect the gravity of his threat. When Henry Aaron, one of the sport's most formidable hitters, was razzed for his improper grip, he replied, 'I ain't up here to read--I'm up here to hit.' Who can argue with 755 home runs and 3,771 career hits?

The Court quotes many baseball maxims, including these:

"The best way to test a Timex would be to strap it to [Earl] Weaver's tongue."

“I have often called Bowie Kuhn a village idiot. I apologize to all the village idiots of America. He is the nation's idiot.” Charlie Finley, 1981.

“[H]is head was full of larceny, but his feet were honest.” “Bugs” Bear on outfielder Ping Bodie, 1917.

“As a lifetime Cubs fan, I was used to players who, as the sportswriters say, ‘can do it all.’ In the case of the Cubs, ‘doing it all’ means striking out, running the wrong way, falling down, dropping the ball.” Mike Royko, writer.

New Form of Alternate Dispute Resolution

I can't improve on this decision. It's pretty short, so here's the whole thing:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

AVISTA MANAGEMENT, INC., d/b/a Avista Plex, Inc.,

Plaintiff,

-vs-

WAUSAU UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

______________________________________

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to designate location of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition (Doc. 105). Upon consideration of the Motion – the latest in a series of Gordian knots that the parties have been unable to untangle without enlisting the assistance of the federal courts – it is

ORDERED that said Motion is DENIED. Instead, the Court will fashion a new form of alternative dispute resolution, to wit: at 4:00 P.M. on Friday, June 30, 2006, counsel shall convene at a neutral site agreeable to both parties. If counsel cannot agree on a neutral site, they shall meet on the front steps of the Sam M. Gibbons U.S. Courthouse, 801 North Florida Ave., Tampa, Florida 33602. Each lawyer shall be entitled to be accompanied by one paralegal who shall act as an attendant and witness. At that time and location, counsel shall engage in one (1) game of “rock, paper, scissors.” The winner of this engagement shall be entitled to select the location for the 30(b)(6) deposition to be held somewhere in Hillsborough County during the period July 11-12, 2006. If either party disputes the outcome of this engagement, an appeal may be filed and a hearing will be held at 8:30 A.M. on Friday, July 7, 2006 before the undersigned in Courtroom 3, George C. Young United States Courthouse and Federal Building, 80 North Hughey Avenue, Orlando, Florida 32801.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Orlando, Florida on June 6, 2006.

Gregory A. Presnell

United States District Judge

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Party

The Court Simply Loves Cigars

Republic of Bolivia v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D. Tex. 1999)

Several countries filed suits in federal courts in the United States. Bolivia filed in the District Court of Brazoria County, Texas. The court transferred the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The Court said:

Why none of these countries seems to have a court system their own governments have confidence in is a mystery to this Court. Moreover, given the tremendous number of United States jurisdictions encompassing fascinating and exotic places, the Court can hardly imagine why the Republic of Bolivia elected to file suit in the veritable hinterlands of Brazoria County, Texas. The Court seriously doubts whether Brazoria County has ever seen a live Bolivian . . . even on the Discovery Channel.

The court found that the D.C. court was better equipped to deal with the case:

Though only here by removal, this humble Court by the sea is certainly flattered by what must be the worldwide renown of rural Texas courts for dispensing justice with unparalleled fairness and alacrity, apparently in common discussion even on the mountain peaks of Bolivia! Still, the Court would be remiss in accepting an obligation for which it truly does not have the necessary resources. Only one judge presides in the Galveston Division-which currently has before it over seven hundred cases and annual civil filings exceeding such number-and that judge is presently burdened with a significant personal situation which diminishes its ability to always give the attention it would like to all of its daunting docket obligations, despite genuinely heroic efforts to do so. And, while Galveston is indeed an international seaport, the capacity of this Court to address the complex and sophisticated issues of international law and foreign relations presented by this case is dwarfed by that of its esteemed colleagues in the District of Columbia who deftly address such awesome tasks as a matter of course. Indeed, this Court, while doing its very best to address the more prosaic matters routinely before it, cannot think of a Bench better versed and more capable of handling precisely this type of case, which requires a high level of expertise in international matters. In fact, proceedings brought by the Republic of Guatemala are currently well underway in that Court in a related action, and there is a request now before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia all six tobacco actions brought by foreign governments, ostensibly for consolidated treatment. Such a Bench, well-populated with genuinely renowned intellects, can certainly better bear and share the burden of multidistrict litigation than this single judge division, where the judge moves his lips when he reads....

It's hard to improve on what the court wrote:

Regardless of, and having nothing to do with, the outcome of Defendants' request for transfer and consolidation, it is the Court's opinion that the District of Columbia, located in this Nation's capital, is a much more logical venue for the parties and witnesses in this action because, among other things, Plaintiff has an embassy in Washington, D.C., and thus a physical presence and governmental representatives there, whereas there isn't even a Bolivian restaurant anywhere near here! Although the jurisdiction of this Court boasts no similar foreign offices, a somewhat dated globe is within its possession. While the Court does not therefrom profess to understand all of the political subtleties of the geographical transmogrifications ongoing in Eastern Europe, the Court is virtually certain that Bolivia is not within the four counties over which this Court presides, even though the words Bolivia and Brazoria are a lot alike and caused some real, initial confusion until the Court conferred with its law clerks. Thus, it is readily apparent, even from an outdated globe such as that possessed by this Court, that Bolivia, a hemisphere away, ain't in south-central Texas, and that, at the very least, the District of Columbia is a more appropriate venue (though Bolivia isn't located there either). Furthermore, as this Judicial District bears no significant relationship to any of the matters at issue, and the judge of this Court simply loves cigars, the Plaintiff can be expected to suffer neither harm nor prejudice by a transfer to Washington, D.C., a Bench better able to rise to the smoky challenges presented by this case, despite the alleged and historic presence there of countless "smoke-filled" rooms. . . .

Mongoose on the Loose!

Langford v. Shu, 128 S.E.2d 210 (N.C. 1962)

With a whoosh and a screech, a furry object, which plaintiff believed to be an animal, sprang out at her. She jumped back and turned to run. She stumbled into a brick wall, tearing a cartilage in her knee. Plaintiff spent 63 days in the hospital,and incurred medical bills in the sum of $2,219.88.

Plaintiff, Mrs. Langford, sued her neighbor, Mrs. Shu. She had seen the wooden box labeled "Danger, African Mongoose, Live Snake Eater" when she came into the house through the back door, passing through a screened back porch. Langford discussed the box with Shu, who told her it was a mongoose and that it eats snakes and bugs.

Shu had two boys, aged nine and eleven. They overheard the conversation and decided they ought to demonstrate the box, which held a foxtail that flew out of the box by means of a spring.

The court held that Shu was liable for her sons' prank:

To reach any other conclusion would be to ignore the propensities of little boys who, since the memory of a man runneth not to the contrary, have delighted to stampede timorous ladies with snakes, bugs, lizards, mice and other rewarding small creatures which hold no terror for youngsters. It is implicit in this evidence that defendant expected to enjoy the joke on her neighbor as much as the children, and that she participated in the act with them. To say that she should not have expected one of the boys to spring ‘the mongoose‘ on plaintiff would strain credulity.
. . . .

Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff the evidence would permit the jury to find that defendant approved and participated in the practical joke her children played on the plaintiff; that defendant knew plaintiff was afraid of snakes and of the contents of the box which defendant had told her contained a mongoose which ate live snakes; that in the exercise of due care defendant could have reasonably foreseen that if a furry object came hurtling from the box toward plaintiff she would become so frightened that she was likely to do herself some bodily harm in headlong flight.

Running in Church Not the Same as Being Hit by a Coconut At Zulu Parade at Mardi Gras

Bass v. Aetna Insurance Co., 370 So.2d 511 (La. 1979)

It was a revival service in church. Reverend Rodney Jeffers, preaching to the congregation of Shepard's Fold Church, stated that the doors of the church should be opened and referred to the possibility of “running.” Mr. Fussell, a member of the church, ran down the church aisle and collided with Mrs. Bass, a member of the church who was in the aisle praying because there weren't enough seats for everyone.

Fussell testified that he was “trotting” under the Spirit of the Lord and does not remember actually running into Mrs. Bass. But another witness testified that she saw Fussell run into Bass and knock her down. The Court said this didn't let Fussell off the hook: "A worshiper in church has no more right to run over a fellow worshiper in the aisle than a passerby on the sidewalk."

The Court specifically rejected the idea that this incident was an "Act of God" (a theory that is sometimes used as a defense to injury claims).

To complicate matters, Fussell was not running for himself but for Reverend Jeffers, so "said to open the doors, he felt like running and he didn't have room because of the crowd and would somebody please run for him.“

Because there had been no previous accidents, Bass did not assume the risk of injury. Bass had been in the church for 25 years and no one had ever run, nor had anyone been injured. Therefore, the Court was not persuaded "that she could or should have known or understood that she was incurring such a risk as, for example, in Schofield v. The Continental Insurance Co., 330 So.2d 376 (La.App.1976), where the spectator at a Zulu parade at Mardi Gras was hit by a coconut thrown from a float."

Next time you're in church and the preacher invites trotting, either sit down or keep your eyes open.

Riding into Court on a Jackrabbit

Smith v. Colonial Penn Insurance Co., 943 F. Supp. 782 (S.D. Tex. 1996).

This case involved a breach of contract based on an insurance policy. The insurance company moved to transfer venue. The fact that the nearest commercial airport was 40 miles away was not enough to warrant transfer.

In the opinion, the Court noted that Galveston does not have a commercial airport into which Defendant's representatives may fly and "out of which they may be expediently whisked to the federal courthouse in Galveston. Rather, Defendant contends that it will be faced with the huge 'inconvenience' of flying into Houston and driving less than forty miles to the Galveston courthouse, an act that will 'encumber' it with 'unnecessary driving time and expenses.'"

The Court said:

The Court, being somewhat familiar with the Northeast, notes that perceptions about travel are different in that part of the country than they are in Texas. A litigant in that part of the country could cross several states in a few hours and might be shocked at having to travel fifty miles to try a case, but in this vast state of Texas, such a travel distance would not be viewed with any surprise or consternation.

The Court quoted a saying: "The sun is 'rize, the sun is set, and we is still in Texas yet!" The Court then sought to educate the litigants concerning Texas:

Defendant should be assured that it is not embarking on a three-week-long trip via covered wagons when it travels to Galveston. Rather, Defendant will be pleased to discover that the highway is paved and lighted all the way to Galveston, and thanks to the efforts of this Court's predecessor, Judge Roy Bean, the trip should be free of rustlers, hooligans, or vicious varmints of unsavory kind. Moreover, the speed limit was recently increased to seventy miles per hour on most of the road leading to Galveston, so Defendant should be able to hurtle to justice at lightning speed. To assuage Defendant's worries about the inconvenience of the drive, the Court notes that Houston's Hobby Airport is located about equal drivetime from downtown Houston and the Galveston courthouse. Defendant will likely find it an easy, traffic-free ride to Galveston as compared to a congested, construction-riddled drive to downtown Houston. The Court notes that any inconvenience suffered in having to drive to Galveston may likely be offset by the peacefulness of the ride and the scenic beauty of the sunny isle.

The Court said, "it is not this Court's concern how Plaintiff gets here, whether it be by plane, train, automobile, horseback, foot, or on the back of a huge Texas jackrabbit, as long as Plaintiff is here at the proper date and time."

Hogging the Court's Resources

Texas Pig Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe International, Inc., 951 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1992)

The Court had to "traverse the barbecue heartland of the South" to resolve the issue of which restaurant got to use the term "pig sandwich" to describe barbecued pig meat on a bun.

The judge was unable to resist titles like "This Little Piggy Went to Market," "Attorney Fees-Did the Court Go Hog Wild?" "Unjust Enrichment -- Did Hard Rock Bring Home the Bacon?" and at the end, "D-D-Dt-D-D-Dt That's All, Folks!

But the Court also acknowledged it could not "rush higgledy-piggy" into these meaty questions, and drew upon the 1930 case of Dixiepig Corp. v. Pig Stand Co., 31 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) to help resolve the issues.

Ultimately the court held that the term "pig sandwich" is protectable and capable of registration as a trademark.

"The Equipment"

Short v. Oig Beto Unit, 2008 WL 2074051 (E.D.Tex. 2008)

In his complaint, Short says that “the equipment” is causing him to suffer bodily injury in many ways, and putting him a state of mind that amounts to constant torture. He says that officers have told him that they are tired of how he is being treated by the equipment.

Short explains that the Office of the Inspector General at the Beto Unit has been monitoring him for years with a transmitter resistor, satellite wire, a “bug wire-tap,” using audio and video, with a “forensic ex-military cutting edge voice satellite,” which he says is an illegal black-market security system. He says that this amounts to an invasion of his privacy and he believes that the system is plugged into a computer.

Short says that he hears the voices of his family members in the air of his cell, and so he believes that the equipment has recorded their voices from their visits to him. He says that he has suffered seizures, migraines, and chest pains as a result of electrical impulses in the equipment and that he heard amplified noises. Short says that the equipment picks up conversations and thoughts, even when he is sleeping, and that it gives him nightmares because of “non-stop talking at close range in my ears while I sleep."

Tinnitus, perhaps?