Drones -- Again

Kanno v. Three Unknown Agents of the Federal Marshals of Oklahoma City Office, Case No. 11-6187 (10th Cir. 11/23/11)

Plaintiff was in jail when he filed his complaint in federal court.  He contends he was under investigation in "secret court' and has been "given an unconstitutional death penalty by the Department of Homeland Security." He also claims he is being slowly burned to death by drones that use a microwave to boil and cook parts of his body, and that he is only alive because he understood the weapons and kept himself wet.

The case was dismissed.  Plaintiff will just have to keep himself wet.

Burning Questions

Lamke v. Futorian Corp., 709 P.2d 684 (Okla. 1985)

Plaintiff fell asleep with a burning cigarette and caught the sofa on fire. She sued the manufacturers of both the cigarette and the sofa, claiming the products were defective and that the manufacturers failed to warn her. Plaintiff alleged the cigarette should have been self-extinguishing. The Court held that the danger was obvious, so no warning was required. As to the sofa, the manufacturer was not required to make a flame-retardant product.

Unbelievable!

Slocum v. Corporate Express US Inc., No. 11-5083 (10th Cir. Nov. 2, 2011)

This case was dismissed by the Court for being implausible, outlandish, and incomprehensible.

Plaintiff's complaint alleged that her former employer, an office-supply company, hired a “surveillance company” to break into her home to install “audio-video equipment,” and repeated the operation after each of her five different changes of address. They took videotape of her unclothed, which they then “broadcast[]...to various radio and television broadcasters,” including Rush Limbaugh, Sean Hannity, and Big Country 99.5 FM. Corporate Express also made death threats, hacked into her computer and distributed her credit card and banking information,  slandered her on national talk radio,  stalked her, denied her access to local universities, commandeered an economics professor to ridicule her in class, precipitated her divorce,  caused an institutionalization that led to a hysterectomy (an excision of the uterus), and, finally, dispatched “agents” to practice a “technique [where] they would go to a restaurant that I was going to, and they would listen to my conversations with friends, and family, and talk to each other about things that only meant something to me, but my friends, and family would not have a clue what was going on." This has gone on for the “last four years and eight months.”  Its purpose has been to “humiliate” and “intimidate the Plaintiff over pending civil litigation.” Some of the wrongdoing was accomplished “in concert” with the Rogers State University Campus Police, “agents” of the State of Oklahoma, and the Claremore, Oklahoma, police department.

Night of the Living Dead

Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 11, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 206 (Tex. 1991)

When the majority of the court reversed Texas law and followed a previous decision -- which had already been expressly overruled -- the minority court filed a dissenting opinion:

"Visiting the graveyard of abandoned legal precedents, the court today mystically revives the corpse of Bradshaw v. Baylor University, 126 Tex. 99, 84 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1935), and the one recovery rule it embodied. We had previously pronounced Bradshaw dead in determining that "the reasoning behind the one recovery rule no longer applies." Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 431, and concluding that "to the extent it conflicts with this opinion, we overrule Bradshaw v. Baylor University." Id. at 432. Now this court has awakened yet another dead tort principle to roam the land, terrorizing victims. As in The Night of the Living Dead, an unthinking zombie is raised to prey on the living. When this court has resurrected enough of these monsters, the landscape of tort law will be bleak indeed, and let the victims beware.   The one recovery rule of Bradshaw is dead, and because I prefer to let the dead rest in peace, I dissent."

I award you no points

Lopez v. Quarterman, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40002 (S.D. Tex. 2009)

After the Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus was dismissed he filed four more motions, totalling 80 pages.  The Court didn't understand them.

"The first of these filings was Petitioner's August 11, 2008 Motion of Continuance of Habeas with Brief in Support (Dkt. No. 18), which the Court described as a "manifesto" in which Petitioner "rambled on for 33 single-spaced, handwritten pages about issues such as 'Transformative Technologies State and Mind,' 'Marxist Leninism Socialism,' 'Naive Optimism of Sloth,' and 'Gnosticism Freemasonry.'" (Dkt. No. 19.) The Court denied Petitioner's motion, noting that Petitioner did not request relief under Rule 60(b), nor did he offer any explanation for his failure to respond to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Id.) Likewise, the Court denied Petitioner's Motion for Bench Warrant and Enter in New Evidence (Dkt. No. 20), filed December 1, 2008, which amounted to an abbreviated version of his earlier Motion for Continuance. (Dkt. No. 21.) The Court noted that "[a]gain, Petitioner has not requested relief under Rule 60(b), nor has he offered any explanation for his failure to respond to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment in a timely manner. Moreover, the Court is unable to ascertain what new evidence Petitioner wishes to present." (Id.)

"Now pending before the Court are Petitioner's third and fourth filings: his Motion of Mandamus to Reverse Dismissal of Habeas Corpus (Dkt. No. 22) and Mandamus to Enter In New Evidence (Dkt. No. 23). For the first time, Petitioner has cited Rule 60(b), 2 but he does not explain why he is entitled to relief under the Rule. Instead, he digresses for another 40 pages on issues such as "Racial Hubris," "Filibustering of Petitioner as a mortal threat as being half-black, half-devil," "National Security," "Mob Caste System Persecution," and "The Catholic Church." (Dkt. Nos. 22 & 23.)


"The Court is unable to interpret or otherwise make sense of either of Petitioner's motions. To the extent a request for relief is buried somewhere in Petitioner's ramblings, it is denied as incomprehensible. Or, in the words of the competition judge to Adam Sandler's title character in the movie, "Billy Madison,"

[W]hat you've just said is one of the most insanely idiotic things I've ever heard. At no point in your rambling, incoherent response was there anything that could even be considered a rational thought. Everyone in this room is now dumber for having listened to it. I award you no points, and may God have mercy on your soul.

"BILLY MADISON (Universal Pictures 1995). . . ."

But the Judge Called It "a Rembrandt"

Richie v. American Council on Gift Annuities, 1996 WL 743343 (N.D. Tex.)

The court was responding to a petition for writ of mandamus, so as to keep the appellate court from being misled as to what was really going on.

"If histrionics and hyperbole were an art form, what the petitioners have filed would be a Rembrandt."

The Court noted that the court file was needlessly prolix, with 403 motions, briefs and letters filed in the court.  "Many are duplicative.  Many do nothing to advance the ball. .  . . Yet the paper keeps flowing and the meter keeps running.  There are 765 documents filed thus far in the district court and my docket sheet in this case rocks on for 116 pages." 

The court said that "From a personal, pragmatic, and selfish standpoint, the granting of a mandamus ordering me to dismiss this case would be a blessing.  This black hole of a case sucks up staff and judicial resuorces like no other case I have dealt with."

Rock, Paper, Scissors

Avista Mgmt. v. Wasau Underwriters Ins. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38526 (M.D. Fla.)

Plaintiff sued an insurance company for not paying an insurance claim fast enough.  The attorneys could not agree on a place to take the deposition fo a witness, and asked the court to intervene.   The Judge was less than amused. After castigating the attorneys for not being able to agree on even the most simplest of things, the court issued this ruling:

"[T]he Court will fashion a new form of alternative dispute resolution, to wit: at 4:00 P.M. on Friday, June 30, 2006, counsel shall convene at a neutral site agreeable to both parties. If counsel cannot agree on a neutral site, they shall meet on the front steps of the [Courthouse]. Each lawyer shall be entitled to be accompanied by one paralegal who shall act as an attendant and witness. At that time and location, counsel shall engage in one (1) game of 'rock, paper, scissors.' The winner of this engagement shall be entitled to select the location for the 30(b)(6) deposition to be held somewhere in Hillsborough County during the period July 11-12, 2006."

The order was cited in Kara Homes, Inc. v. Century Kitchens, Inc., 374 B.R. 542 (Bkcy. D.N.J. 2007) as an example of the types dispute resolution available to the parties, stating that "even a game of "rock, paper, scissors" has been given judicial imprimatur as an acceptable dispute resolution mechanism."

Tennis Balls Were Stolen From Prisoner's Head

Riches v. Williams, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67446 (W.D. Va. 2007)

A prisoner filed his fourth civil rights action, after the first t hree were dismissed as frivolous.  He struck out on the fourth one, too, even though the defendants had done terrible things to him:

Riches names tennis players Venus and Serena Williams, their father Richard Williams, the "U.S. Open," and "poltergeist" as defendants to his action. He claims that defendants Venus and Serena Williams are "reaching through the T.V. set to grab [him] during the U.S. Open," in an "attempted coup of [his] mind." He also alleges that the poltergeist is "roaming our airwaves and CB radio." He states that Richard Williams has had a "beef with [him] since the Nixon era" and that "he still rents summer homes from Randy Weaver." Riches claims that the tennis balls used in the U.S. Open are "electrons and neurons stolen from [his] head." He alleges that the defendants also "took Van Gogh paintings from [him]." He further alleges that Serena Williams "put  the knife in Monica Seles shoulder" in 1999 and that he taught Venus Williams how to play table tennis in the county jail in 2004. Finally, he claims that the defendants told him that "they want to eat [his] head for supper" and that they want to "learn identity theft from [him]." As relief, Riches asks the courts to "withdraw the Williams sisters from any more tennis tournaments" and, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 64, "seize U.S. Open tennis balls [and] bring [his] neurons back [to him]."

In Riches v. Dierks, 2008 U.S. Dist . LEXXIS 21085, the Court dismissed 58 lawsuits Riches had filed:


CLARKSBURG RICHES CASES

1. 1:08-cv-2. Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983 and whistle blowing act. Coal plants in West Virginia is responsible on global warning and the gasses travel to S. Carolina to give me carbon poisoning. West Virginia releases the most CO2 gasses in America that endangers my health. I seek $ 25 million for respiratory damages.

2. 1:08-cv-3. Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983. Defendant is in prison holding in West Virginia and plans to come to FCI Williamsburg with my co-defendant Jason Michael Carpenter to inflict bodily harm on me. I'm in danger of my co-defendant, I seek a restraining order forbidding them from coming to FCI Williamsburg.

3. 1:08-cv-4. Complaint 42 USC 1983. I seek $ 4.6 million. I seek a restraining order against Bolliger in West Virginia. I've been harassed by mail by defendant. Also on Dec. 24, 2007, FCI Williamsburg did not give me my mail, this is not a federal holiday, but guards got paid time and a half, a waste of tax payers money. I'm whistle blowing.

4. 1:08-cv-5.  Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983, I seek 2 million dollars. Klinger is an old friend of mine, she has a bunch of computer equipment and a digital camera that belongs to me over interstate lines. She wont retorn my property, she won't respond to my letters or phone calls. I'm neglected from emotional damage. I seek the return of my property.

5. 1:08-cv-6 Complaint 42 USC 1983. My civil rights are violated. I seek $ 92 thousand. Stefanie was my co-defendant, she is neglecting me in West Virginia. I have to discuss court order restitution issues with her but she lost her cell phone. I'm endangered of going to prison and violating parole if I don't pay my fines. I still love Stefanie, but my rights are violated.

6. 1:08-cv-7. Complaint. 42 USC 1983, I seek $ 10 million for defamation of character, she talks negative about me over the internet, the service provider in West Virginia. She neglects to talk about prison abuses inflicted on me in solitary at FCI Williamsburg, I can't get internet access, this is unconstitutional.

7. 1:08-cv-8 Complaint 42 USC 1983. My constitutional rights are violated, I'm endangered by Defendant. Defendant has college ties with West Virginia and Clarksburg, and plans to hurt me. I'm in solitary confinement, this is unconstitutional and abusive, a major civil rights violation. I seek $ 11 million.

8. 1:08-cv-9. Complaint. 42 USC 1983, I seek $ 7 million. Ryder stole my constitutional rights, she told FCI Williamsburg to shoplift my property. I'm in solitary with no access to all my legal work to address civil litigation, this is unconstitutional.

9. 1:08-cv-10. Complaint. 42 USC 1983, Tani is in the sky above West Virginia in a NASA spacecraft watching and spying on any life. This is invasion of privacy. My civil rights are violated, when I take a shower at FCI Williamsburg, guards watch me, my curtain is see through, this inflicts embarrassment on me. I seek $ 7 million.

10. 1:08-cv-11. Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983. This is a international fugitive that plans to work at FCI Williamsburg and be a correctional guard to inflict genocide on me. I'm in danger from defendant, I'm in solitary like a sitting duck at FCI Williamsburg, this treatment is unconstitutional. I seek $ 3 million.

11. 1:08-cv-12. Complaint. 42 USC 1983. Chmerkovskiy is responsible for not giving me my mail on Saturdays with FCI Williamsburg. This is unconstitutional, I have a right to mail on Saturdays. We don't get it until Monday night, that causes me delays, abuse, neglect, solitary confinement is holding me for no reason, because I'm a independent. I seek $ 17 million for civil rights violation.

12. 1:08-cv-13. Complaint. 42 USC 1983 and TRO. I seek a restraining order. FCI Williamsburg plans to ship me to another solitary confinement in Northern West Virginia. My confinement is torture. I hear noise all night, I can't sleep or stretch my legs or see sun light, this is a civil rights violation. I seek $ 26 million.

13. 1:08-cv20. Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983 I have a international warrant detainer lodged against me by defendant who posted it in the New York Times, but violates my due process without giving me a revocation hearing. Gall is a probation officer/journalist for the Kenyan Times. Gall rigged election results, and runs marathons with Kenyans. I seek $ 5 million and the release of my detainer.

14. 1:08-cv-21. Complaint. 42 USC 1983. Federal tort claims. Defendant wrote 16 articles about me circulating nationwide that I hacked into the White House and the National Archives with Sandy Berger. Margaret said I put a Trojan Horse in microsofts windows operating system and spread the melissa virus. These Articles are defamation of character. I seek $ 5 million and a restraining order.

15. 1:08-cv-22. Complaint. 42 USC 1983. Crosby is discrimination against federal inmates, I'm illegally incarcerated and he will not donate me Pittsburgh Penguins Tickets to see him, not having prison furlough's is a violation of cruel and unusual punishment, I can't watch hockey games in prison. There is not enough white Inmates to watch. I seek $ 10 million.

16. 1:08-cv-24 Complaint. 42 USC 1983. I seek a restraining order. I seek $ 3 million. Khanani committed fraud in my name. I'm being exposed that can put me in harms way. I move to stop Khanani from bothering me. I pray for relief.

17. 1:08-cv-25. Complaint. 42 USC 1983. Slander on my name, Scotti wrote an article about me in Nov 2007 issue. I move for defendant to respond, I can submit the article as evidence. Now I receive threats in the mail

18. 1:08-cv-26. Complaint. 42 USC 1983. I move  for a restraining order TRO. Hof is the supervisor to Businessweek that wrote a 2007 Article about credit card fraud. It mentioned my name and location. This is invasion of privacy. I move to stop the circulation of Businessweek.

19. 1:08-cv-27. Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983. I seek $ 5 million in damages. Since I been exposed, defendants are putting me in danger. I seek a TRO temporary restraining order.

20. 1:08-cv-28 Complaint 42 USC 1983. I seek a TRO Temporary Restraining order. Fraud was done under my name. Hino Josa knows my location in South Carolina. Hino Josa lives in Clarksburg. I don't want him to bother me anymore.

21. 1:08-cv-29. Complaint. 42 USC 1983. Moves for a TRO Temporary Restraining order and preliminary injunction. If Comsa transfer to my prison, I could be in danger. He writes articles about my location that puts me in harms way

22. 1:08-cv-30. Complaint. 42 USC 1983. I seek a restraining Order. Patriarca is mad because I took his credit card Visa in 2001, now I'm sentenced, I fear he or his friends are going to come after me.

23. 1:08-cv-31. Complaint. TRO Temporary Restraining Order under 42 USC 1983. This court needs to put a restraining order on Marino. I'm in fear, he was a victim of mine in my criminal case.

24. 1:08-cv-32. Complaint. 42 USC 1983. I seek a TRO Temporary Restraining Order. Mr. Gigante personally wants to do me harm. I seek injunctive relief.

25. 1:08-cv-33. Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983 and TRO Temporary Restraining order. I fear defendant is coming after me and I seek protection.

26. 1:08-cv-34. Complaint 42 USC 1983 and a TRO Temporary Restraining order. Persico is after me from West Virginia. I seek protection for relief

27. 1:08-cv-35. Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983. I seek a TRO Temporary Restraining order. I fear Mr. Gambino is going to come after me. He was a Identity theft victim of mine. I seek relief.

28. 1:08-cv-36 Complaint. 42 USC 1983. I seek a TRO Temporary Restraining order. I'm on Federal property. Ferrara is going to do me bodily harm, I seek relief from this court.

29. 1:08-cv-37. Complaint. 42 USC 1983 I seek a TRO Temporary Restraining order. I fear Flemmi and Bulger is going to do me harm. The Courts are the only people to protect me. I seek protection

30.1:08-cv-38 Complaint 42 USC 1983. Bivens action and Temporary Restraining order. I have alot of people after me including defendant. I seek protection.

ELKINS RICHES CASES

31. 2:08-cv-2 Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983. Yancey won't report anything on prison abuse, she is a travel reporter instead. She does not visit FCI Williamsburg to report horrible conditions in solitary. I see rats, rodents, bugs, bats, unknown species, my cell is freezing, this is unconstitutional. I seek $ 10 million.

32. 2:08-cv-3 Complaint. 42 USC 1983. I can't receive religion, this is a constitutional violation. I'm in solitary and no one will give me a bible. I have a constitutional right to a bible, no one prays for me. Defendant is after me. I seek a restraining order.

33. 2:08-cv-8 Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983. Violation of Due process. Curtis knows the Supreme Court violated my criminal case under Booker and FanFan. Curtis is related to Jamie Lee Curtis and acts like she does not care. The Observer is not observing prison torture inflicted on me. I seek $ 11 million.

34. 2:08-cv-9 Complaint. 42 USC 1983. My civil rights are violated. Defendants grandfather made the atom bomb in the 1940's and gave the secrets and blueprints to defendant, who plans to drop a new atom bomb version from Virgin Airlines over top FCI Williamsburg on federal property. Defendant lives in  West Virginia. He also is a newspaper writer who advocates prison abuse. I'm personally offended. I'm mistreated. I seek $ 15 million for my illegal incarceration.

35. 2:08-cv-10 Complaint. 42 USC 1983. FCI Williamsburg is violating my civil rights. I can't play Playstation. Campus want to turn my life into a video game and remote control me. My case is being a game. I lose in my video game. My life is in danger. I seek $ 26 million and a restraining order.

36. 2:08-cv-13 Complaint. TRO Temporary Restraining Order. I move under 42 USC 1983 and a Bivens action. Defendant wrote a article on me that endangers my safety, letting everyone know I'm at FCI Williamsburg. I move to stop the circulation. I pray for relief.

MARTINSBURG RICHES CASES

37. 3:08-cv-00011 Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983. My civil rights are violated. Defendant committed Fraud acts and put me in prison under Booker and FanFan violation. I can't use a computer. I seek $ 15 million in damages. I also seek a restraining order preventing transfer to FCI Williamsburg.
38. 3:08-cv-00012 Complaint. TRO temporary restraining order. Under USC 1983. Mr. Megale and Riccitelli in Federal prisons in West Virginia. If they transfer to me,  they will do me harm. I'm scared, I move to stop the transfer.

WHEELING RICHES CASES

39. 5:08-cv-1 Complaint. 42 USC 1983. This facility harbors Warren Jeff's followers and guards at FCI Williamsburg attends the symphony for training, then abuse inmates. Noone turns my light off. I get served cold expired food. I seek $ 10 Million for civil rights violations.

40. 5:08-cv-2 Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983. Major civil rights and abuses. I'm in solitary with Termini's nephew. Termini has other law suits on him for food poisoning. FCI Williamsburg contracts food through Termini. My food has no nutritional value. I get sick, constipated, and dizzy eating Termini's food. I seek $ 425 thousand.

41. 5:08-cv-7 Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983 & invasion of privacy and Restraining order. Defendant's committed identity theft. They have my social security # and date of birth in their computers without my consent. I want this information deleted. I compel defendants to eliminate my credit file, Defendants employees have access to my material. I seek $ 15 million.

42. 5:08-cv-8 Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983. My civil rights are violated. Gorman is planting seeds in my head. My life is a science fiction. I'm  illegally incarcerated by defendant and he won't report my abuses to F.B.I. He also got FCI Williamsburg medical staff to puncture my brain stem cells. I'm not getting proper medical care. I seek $ 15 million in damage

43. 5:08-cv-9 Complaint. 42 USC 1983. I seek a restraining order. Niarchos is a boy toy for Paris Hilton and Nichole Ritchie. I sued Ritchie in Court, now she is sending defendant's and greeks after me. The Battle of Troy at FCI Williamsburg. This facility can't protect a trojan horse. Niarchos has shipping connections and will stop me from sending this lawsuit to this court. Niarchos has a expired visa but is roaming the earth with my identity. I fear for my life and seek $ 10 million

44. 5:08-cv-12 Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983. I also seek a TRO Temporary Restraining order. Defendant committed fraud and is in prison. I move for a restraining order to prevent the transfer to her facility. I'm a changed person, my life is in danger. I seek $ 8 million.

45. 5:08-cv-13 Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983. I did business with Converge now and Mr. Farrington in 2002 and I got my money taken, my civil rights are violated in prison. I don't have a lawyer to handle my legal affairs.  I seek $ 15 million because I lost all my investments from defendant

46. 5:08-cv-14 Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983. Rayborn was convicted of stealing from the Church. I'm offended. On 1-5-08, I don't have trust in the Baptist Church anymore. I compel defendant not to transfer to FCI Williamsburg. I seek $ 17 million

47. 5:08-cv-15 Complaint. 42 USC 1983. Defendant Wiele committed acts of credit card fraud with the CVV2 on the back of my credit card. My identity was stolen in West Virginia. Defendant got a charge card in my name. I seek $ 17 million and a Restraining order

48. 5:08-cv-16 Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983. Defendant is trying to defraud me. Defendant committed check fraud and identity theft. I was involved with a ponzi scam, I was a victim. I seek $ 35 million and a Restraining order

49. 5:08-cv-17 Complaint. 42 USC 1983. Goodwin is a unindicted co-defendant. She did Western Union fraud with title services. I'm in prison illegally. Western Unions call center is in West Virginia I seek $ 9 million and a Restraining order

50. 5:08-cv-18 Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983. I seek $ 5 million. Robertson commits computer fraud, that effected my federal sentencing, my civil rights are violated.  I seek a restraining order.

52. 5:08-cv-20 Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983. My civil rights are violated. Hovanesian is not reporting the for profit business of federal prison Industries. This is slave a labor institution of abuses a modern day sweat shot at FCI Williamsburg I seek $ 11 million for pain and suffering.

53. 5:08-cv-21 Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983 and the whistle blowing act. The Imam is donating fraud money to the Holyland Foundation. I'm Jewish and my life is in danger. I seek a Restraing order I seek $ 10 million in relief.

54. 5:08-cv-22 Complaint. Under 42 USC 1983 and federal tort claims for computer Fraud and investment securities fraud, Pinkney endangered my stocks with the stock market and hacked into my brokerage account. I seek 32 million and a Restraining order. Defendant wants to inflict bodily harm on me.

55. 5:08-cv-24 Complaint. 42 USC 1983. I seek a TRO Temporary Restraining Order. I'm scared of Gravano. I been getting harassed by the mail, the prison won't help me, I compel defendant to stop.

56. 5:08-cv-32 Class Action Suit/Temporary Restraining Order. Comes now the plaintiffs in a class action suit seeking a Temporary Restraining order against defendants.  Plaintiff Riches resides in Salters, SC. Plaintiff Haddy lives in Florence, S.C. Plaintiff Sprint Spectrum is located in Kingstree, S.C. Plaintiff's are a anti-fraud social networking group. Defendants have threatened Plaintiff's via the mail and email with bodily harm and physical threats and injury because of plaintiff's beliefs. This is a hate crime. This has been occuring every day since Jan 2007. Plaintiffs lives are in imminent danger. Plaintiffs seek preliminary injunctive relief against defendants and compel defendants not to threaten or harass plaintiffs anymore.

57. 5:08-cv-33 Class Action Suit/Temporary Restraining order. Comes now the Plaintiffs, seeking a Temporary Restraining order Against defendants. On 1-2-08 and 1-4-08 Defendants have threated all of the Plaintiffs with bodily harm. Plaintiffs face imminent danger

58. 5:08-cv-34 Class Action Suit/Temporary restraining order. Plaintiffs are in imminent danger. Plaintiffs seek a restraining order from defendants. Defendants stole plaintiff's identities on 12-30-07, and are getting store credit in Plaintiffs names at Ethan Allen. Plaintiffs lives are in danger and compel defendants to stop. Plaintiffs are scared.

Ghost Busters!

Stambovky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1991)

"Who ya gonna call?" asks the Court, remembering a movie entitled "Ghost Busters," a 1984 sci-fi flick starring Dan Aykroyd and Bill Murray.

The plaintiffs wanted the return of the down payment back on the house they were going to buy, because it reputedly had poltergeists.  The court ruled that the vendor was estopped to deny existence of poltergeists on the premises.  "Whether the source of the spectral apparitions seen by defendant seller are parapsychic or psychogenic, having reported their presence in both a national publication (“Readers' Digest”) and the local press (in 1977 and 1982, respectively), defendant is estopped to deny their existence and, as a matter of law, the house is haunted."  The Court stated:

While I agree with Supreme Court that the real estate broker, as agent for the seller, is under no duty to disclose to a potential buyer the phantasmal reputation of the premises and that, in his pursuit of a legal remedy for fraudulent misrepresentation against the seller, plaintiff hasn't a ghost of a chance, I am nevertheless moved by the spirit of equity to allow the buyer to seek rescission of the contract of sale and recovery of his downpayment. New York law fails to recognize any remedy for damages incurred as a result of the seller's mere silence, applying instead the strict rule of caveat emptor. Therefore, the theoretical basis for granting relief, even under the extraordinary facts of this case, is elusive if not ephemeral.
The court also said that haunting is not a condition which can and should be ascertained by reasonable inspection of the premises. The buyer was allowed to back out of the transaction:

In the case at bar, defendant seller deliberately fostered the public belief that her home was possessed. Having undertaken to inform the public at large, to whom she has no legal relationship, about the supernatural occurrences on her property, she may be said to owe no less a duty to her contract vendee. It has been remarked that the occasional modern cases which permit a seller to take unfair advantage of a buyer's ignorance so long as he is not actively misled are “singularly unappetizing” (Prosser, Law of Torts § 106, at 696 [4th ed. 1971] ). Where, as here, the seller not only takes unfair advantage of the buyer's ignorance but has created and perpetuated a condition about which he is unlikely to even inquire, enforcement of the contract (in whole or in part) is offensive to the court's sense of equity. Application of the remedy of rescission, within the bounds of the narrow exception to the doctrine of caveat emptor set forth herein, is entirely appropriate to relieve the unwitting purchaser from the consequences of a most unnatural bargain.

Animal Cruelty

Lock v. Falkenstine, 380 P.2d 278 (Okla. Cr. 1963)

This was a criminal case to prevent chicken fighting contests. The Court quoted none other than Abraham Lincoln, who said, "As long as the Almighty permitted intelligent men, created in his image and likeness, to fight in public and kill each other while the world looks on approvingly, it's not for me to deprive the chickens of the same privilege."

The statute at issue was 21 O.S. 1682, which provides:

"Every person who maliciously, or for any bet, stake, or reward, instigates or encourages any fight between animals, or instigates or encourages any animal to attack, bite, wound or worry another, is guilty of a misdemeanor."

The Court had to determine whether the statute which prohibited people from instigating fights between "animals," included "chickens," which turned upon the issue of whether a chicken is an animal. To resolve the issue, the Court reviewed the Book of Genesis in the Bible. The court also drew from a New Mexico case addressing the same issue:

"Thus we reach the conclusion that the type of cruelty to animal statute we are construing was not passed with the intention of prohibiting such sports as cock fighting. We further believe that, to so construe the statute, would open up many other activities to prosecution, though they are not within its spirit. For example, using live minnows to bait hooks.

"`These statutes are the outgrowth of modern sentiment. They spring originally from tentative efforts of the New England colonies to enforce imperfect but well recognized moral obligations. * * * Society could not long tolerate a system of laws which might drag to the criminal bar every lady who might impale a butterfly, or every man who might drown a litter of kittens.'

The court ruled that the statute was invalid.  Chickens can fight, and kittens can be drowned. 

Driving Delusions

Breunig v. American Family Ins. Co., 173 N.W.2d 619 (1970)

Philip Breunig sued for damages received when his truck was struck by an automobile driven by Erma Veith.

The evidence established that Mrs. Veith, on her way home after taking her husband to work, saw a white light on the back of a car ahead of her. She followed this light for three or four blocks. She did not remember anything else except landing in a field, lying on the side of the road.

A psychiatrist testified Mrs. Veith told him she was driving on a road when she believed that God was taking ahold of the steering wheel and was directing her car. She saw the truck coming and stepped on the gas in order to become air-borne because she knew she could fly because Batman does it. To her surprise she was not air-borne before striking the truck -- but after the impact she was flying.

Mrs. Veith's car continued west for about a mile until the road took a gradual turn to the right. At this turn her car left the road and came to rest in a cornfield. When a traffic officer came to the car, he found Mrs. Veith sitting behind the wheel looking off into space. He could not get a statement of any kind from her.
At trial, a judgment was entered against her.

Poetic Justice

Norman v. Reagan, 95 F.R.D. 476 (D. Ore. 1982)

"In this action, Kent © Norman seeks redress of grievances," said the court, noting that "The plaintiff's name apparently includes the copyright sign." The claims include "civil death," parking tickets, and a "claim" that defied characterization:

The birds today
Are singing loudly,
The day is fresh
With the sounds
Upon the wind
The crickets.
The blackbirds
The woodpeckers
Beauty in every
Spark of life
Just So their sounds
Are appreciated
Their sounds are beauty
The ants are silent
But always searching
The birds noise a song
and the fade of the automobile tires
Chirp. A shadow from
a passing monarch butterfly
Breathless in Colorado.

The court mused, "It is possible, of course, that this is not intended as a claim at all, but as a literary artifact." The court ultimately concluded the suit could be dismissed for lack of prosecution.

"All Were Infested With Ideas and Cooties."

Murrow Indian Orphans Home v. Childers, 171 P.2d 600 (Okla. 1946)

The dissenting opinion by Judge Riley chronicles the sad history of the State of Oklahoma, the country, and indeed the world, meandering through the Norman Conquest, the arraignment of Ben Johnson, Henry VII, Roger Williams, the Constitutional Convention, and ending with the day the judge's father, a Baptist from Alabama, became a passenger on the first train to enter Ft. Worth, Texas.

The opening paragraph is hard to forget (and I've tried):

It is said a new idea is painful, even to the intelligentsia, so I shall deal only with tragedies of history, also sometimes voluminous and burdensome. Union of church and state is often productive of religious strife, persecutions, and so, horrible to freedom. The reason for dealing with this aspect of history is that some say it can't happen here. The men who are Justices of the Supreme Court constitute the personnel of an instrumentality of government; they are expendable and so they may not be here if it does happen. The instrumentality and the free government, like Tennyson's brook, must go on forever. I shall not assume the role of a prophet, for I know only the brief epilogue of the state that is Oklahoma. All of this I saw and a part of it I was. At that juncture in the state's history when first the young manhood of it went forth in an effort to save, and did for a time, with the aid of others, save civilization - some of them to return covered with glory for their achievement as at the present time, but all were infested with ideas and cooties. Nevertheless these returned soldiers sought to solve in the Western state and in officialdom the unemployment problem and to build here their homes.

Seldom will a Supreme Court Justice mention "cooties." The issue was the Constitutionality of State payments to institutions for care of orphan children, and the court held that the law was valid.

This is one of those opinions that's hard to summarize; you just have to read for yourself.

Toilet Squabble

Vacarro v. Stephens, No. CV-86-0187-SC (9th Cir. 5/1/89)

On a flight from New York to San Francisco, Sue Vaccaro (a Spanish-Filipino American) left her seat somewhere over Minnesota to use the lavatory. Food service carts blocked access. The flight attendant directed her to use a lavatory in the first class section. While she was waiting in line, a Texan told her "You're a disgrace in those jeans. Get out of first class where you don't belong. Someone like you would dirty the first class bathroom." He pushed her against the wall, referring to her as a "chink slut and a whore." Passengers and crew separated the contestants. The Texan made it to the bathroom ahead of Sue Vaccaro. She eventually returned to her seat in coach class.

When they arrived to San Francisco, Vaccaro asked police to arrest the Texan for assault and battery, but they refused to do so. She made a citizens arrest and then turned him over to the police who booked him.

Vaccaro then sued the Texan. He counterclaimed for false arrest and trespass. The court ruled he had no damages, because he'd gotten to use the rest room first. The court gave an example from the Restatement:

A's child climbs upon the back of B's large dog and pulls its ears. No harm to the dog, or to any other legally protected interest of B. A is not liable to B.

Vaccaro won $5,000 in compensatory damages and $3,000 in punitive damages. All in all, her trip to the toilet was moderately lucrative.

Turtles Rule

Weeks v. Jones, 52 F.3d 1559 (11th Crr. 1995)

Petitioner was sentenced to death for the killing of a veterinary student. Petitioner filed two petitions for habeas corpus relief in the federal courts, which were denied. Petitioner also sought review of his sentence in the state court system, to no avail. The court concluded that the issues raised by petitioner were not debatable among jurists of reason and could not be resolved differently. Specifically, Weeks believed that he is God and that after his death, he will reign in heaven as a tortoise.

Donkey Flatulence

Kirklewski v. Hamilton, 2008 WL 302357 (S.D.Ohio 2008)

One of Plaintiff's objections to a Magistrate's report and recommendations was that the Magistrate Judge did not advert to “outer space flying donkey flatulence affected outer space flying elephant causing elephant to crash into asteroid beyond planet Earth humanity awareness.”

The court said: "Plaintiff is completely correct: neither in the Report and Recommendations nor in any other conscious act as a judge has the Magistrate Judge ever adverted to donkey flatulence of any kind. Indeed “outer space flying donkey flatulence” is a concept which was, until the Exceptions were filed, well beyond my imagination. . . . While the Magistrate Judge had not considered the matter before now, it would seem that this precedent would counsel the Court against exercising jurisdiction over disputes between flatulent outer space animals, especially if they symbolize our major political parties."

More Livestock Shenanigans

Guthrie v. Powell, 290 P.2d 834 (Kan. 1955)

Mrs. Guthrie and her husband went to Winfield Sales Company, a place where livestock was being sold. She was sitting in a chair visiting with other ladies when a 600-pound steer fell onto her lap:

At about 1 p. m. of said day plaintiff was seated in a chair at the north end of the south main floor room engaged in visiting and conversing with women friends and acquaintances, most of whom were the wives of patrons attending said sale. Suddenly, there was a loud commotion and noise overhead and simultaneously bits of plaster and debris began to fall from the ceiling onto plaintiff and others standing or sitting near her which was followed instantaneously--as plaintiff later learned--by a six hundred pound steer falling through the ceiling immediately over and approximately twelve feet above her position, said beast falling and landing upon plaintiff as she sat in said chair, knocking her unconscious, flattening the chair and plaintiff to the floor and under said steer and causing painful, serious and permanent injuries to her as hereinafter set forth.

I am not sure how the cows got upstairs. Would the stairs actually hold up against a 600-pound steer? Can can cows even walk up stairs? They aren't all that delicate.

Contributory Negligence & Cows

Sharpe v. Aqua Systems, 13 So.2d 903 (Fla. 1943)

Sharpe got off the bus and turned directly in front of it to cross the street, stepping directly in the path of a passing truck -- which he did not see until it struck him, even though the street was clear and unobstructed. This case is a reminder of how much society has changed since 1943:

This case is a mute reminder that our pattern of highway behavior has failed ignominiously to keep pace with our climate of intellectual and aesthetic culture. Men and women of normal faculties and college tutored who would stick their heads in a noose before they would lap their soup, eat their peas with a knife, or wear unmatched garments, will alight from a motor vehicle or appear out of the blue and walk or drive as nonchalantly as a wire grass cow on to a paved speedway in front of moving traffic. The number of cases that are making their way to the courts as a result of such accidents is distressing and nine-tenths of them could be avoided with reasonable precaution.

Moral, if your pattern of highway behavior must be that of the age of the pack horse, stay on the cow trails. If you insist on traveling the modern highway, then move your pattern up to the age of rapid transit.

Huh?

Gonzalez v. Police Com'r Bratton, 2000 WL 1191558 (S.D.N.Y)

Can anyone explain what this means??!!

"The law by its very nature records many matters that embody the perception, progression and maturation of external events. Legal disputes, requiring the analysis and cataloguing of what has occurred, then often demand an exercise of retrospection and reconstruction that brings to mind an image of a time-motion study. Its object is to focus by close-up on the precise moment that gives rise to rights and engenders corresponding duties to invoke them. This case calls for such a task. The various issues in contention here demand calibrated judgments about the interrelation of time and events: the moment in a continuum when fine lines of conduct fade from one form of action and ripen into another; when conduct of one person becomes sufficiently manifest and identifiable for what it is so as to give it a name, load it with legal meaning, and charge another person both with recognition of the act and a duty to respond formally to it; when, to the contrary, the realm of perception of things seen and felt may be misleading, by presenting, like the proverbial tip of the iceberg, an incomplete picture of a reality unknown to the beholder but possessing much larger mass and essence than the fragment of it that peers into view; and when the point arrives at which an act or omission by one person or group may by association and through imputation ripen into responsibility for actions in fact taken by another.”

His head was full of larceny but his feet were honest

Burris v. King, 588 F.Supp. 1152 (D. Colo. 1984)

This was a suit for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. It began with an argument at the 1981 winter meetings of the American Association of Professional Baseball Clubs. A baseball manager got into a name calling contest and threatened another manager with a Sprite bottle. Before getting into the facts, the court wrote an essay about baseball which was unrelated to the facts of the case, including this:

After a solid career, Dick Allen is most renowned for his comment: “If horses don't eat it, I don't want to play on it.” Dave Lemonds of the Chicago White Sox once said that playing on artificial turf “is like playing marbles in a bathtub.”

The facts of this case are that two managers got into an argument and one manager threatened the other with a Sprite bottle.

The pleadings and supporting affidavits clearly specify that the bottle was a Sprite bottle. They are unclear as to whether Burris' intended delivery was overhand, sidearm, or submarine style, or whether Burris was gripping the bottle properly, label side up. Had Burris gripped the bottle properly, so that he could read the label, it would have been difficult for King to see it as well. The propriety of Burris' grip, however, does not affect the gravity of his threat. When Henry Aaron, one of the sport's most formidable hitters, was razzed for his improper grip, he replied, 'I ain't up here to read--I'm up here to hit.' Who can argue with 755 home runs and 3,771 career hits?

The Court quotes many baseball maxims, including these:

"The best way to test a Timex would be to strap it to [Earl] Weaver's tongue."

“I have often called Bowie Kuhn a village idiot. I apologize to all the village idiots of America. He is the nation's idiot.” Charlie Finley, 1981.

“[H]is head was full of larceny, but his feet were honest.” “Bugs” Bear on outfielder Ping Bodie, 1917.

“As a lifetime Cubs fan, I was used to players who, as the sportswriters say, ‘can do it all.’ In the case of the Cubs, ‘doing it all’ means striking out, running the wrong way, falling down, dropping the ball.” Mike Royko, writer.

New Form of Alternate Dispute Resolution

I can't improve on this decision. It's pretty short, so here's the whole thing:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ORLANDO DIVISION

AVISTA MANAGEMENT, INC., d/b/a Avista Plex, Inc.,

Plaintiff,

-vs-

WAUSAU UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant.

______________________________________

ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion to designate location of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition (Doc. 105). Upon consideration of the Motion – the latest in a series of Gordian knots that the parties have been unable to untangle without enlisting the assistance of the federal courts – it is

ORDERED that said Motion is DENIED. Instead, the Court will fashion a new form of alternative dispute resolution, to wit: at 4:00 P.M. on Friday, June 30, 2006, counsel shall convene at a neutral site agreeable to both parties. If counsel cannot agree on a neutral site, they shall meet on the front steps of the Sam M. Gibbons U.S. Courthouse, 801 North Florida Ave., Tampa, Florida 33602. Each lawyer shall be entitled to be accompanied by one paralegal who shall act as an attendant and witness. At that time and location, counsel shall engage in one (1) game of “rock, paper, scissors.” The winner of this engagement shall be entitled to select the location for the 30(b)(6) deposition to be held somewhere in Hillsborough County during the period July 11-12, 2006. If either party disputes the outcome of this engagement, an appeal may be filed and a hearing will be held at 8:30 A.M. on Friday, July 7, 2006 before the undersigned in Courtroom 3, George C. Young United States Courthouse and Federal Building, 80 North Hughey Avenue, Orlando, Florida 32801.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Orlando, Florida on June 6, 2006.

Gregory A. Presnell

United States District Judge

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Party

The Court Simply Loves Cigars

Republic of Bolivia v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D. Tex. 1999)

Several countries filed suits in federal courts in the United States. Bolivia filed in the District Court of Brazoria County, Texas. The court transferred the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The Court said:

Why none of these countries seems to have a court system their own governments have confidence in is a mystery to this Court. Moreover, given the tremendous number of United States jurisdictions encompassing fascinating and exotic places, the Court can hardly imagine why the Republic of Bolivia elected to file suit in the veritable hinterlands of Brazoria County, Texas. The Court seriously doubts whether Brazoria County has ever seen a live Bolivian . . . even on the Discovery Channel.

The court found that the D.C. court was better equipped to deal with the case:

Though only here by removal, this humble Court by the sea is certainly flattered by what must be the worldwide renown of rural Texas courts for dispensing justice with unparalleled fairness and alacrity, apparently in common discussion even on the mountain peaks of Bolivia! Still, the Court would be remiss in accepting an obligation for which it truly does not have the necessary resources. Only one judge presides in the Galveston Division-which currently has before it over seven hundred cases and annual civil filings exceeding such number-and that judge is presently burdened with a significant personal situation which diminishes its ability to always give the attention it would like to all of its daunting docket obligations, despite genuinely heroic efforts to do so. And, while Galveston is indeed an international seaport, the capacity of this Court to address the complex and sophisticated issues of international law and foreign relations presented by this case is dwarfed by that of its esteemed colleagues in the District of Columbia who deftly address such awesome tasks as a matter of course. Indeed, this Court, while doing its very best to address the more prosaic matters routinely before it, cannot think of a Bench better versed and more capable of handling precisely this type of case, which requires a high level of expertise in international matters. In fact, proceedings brought by the Republic of Guatemala are currently well underway in that Court in a related action, and there is a request now before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to transfer to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia all six tobacco actions brought by foreign governments, ostensibly for consolidated treatment. Such a Bench, well-populated with genuinely renowned intellects, can certainly better bear and share the burden of multidistrict litigation than this single judge division, where the judge moves his lips when he reads....

It's hard to improve on what the court wrote:

Regardless of, and having nothing to do with, the outcome of Defendants' request for transfer and consolidation, it is the Court's opinion that the District of Columbia, located in this Nation's capital, is a much more logical venue for the parties and witnesses in this action because, among other things, Plaintiff has an embassy in Washington, D.C., and thus a physical presence and governmental representatives there, whereas there isn't even a Bolivian restaurant anywhere near here! Although the jurisdiction of this Court boasts no similar foreign offices, a somewhat dated globe is within its possession. While the Court does not therefrom profess to understand all of the political subtleties of the geographical transmogrifications ongoing in Eastern Europe, the Court is virtually certain that Bolivia is not within the four counties over which this Court presides, even though the words Bolivia and Brazoria are a lot alike and caused some real, initial confusion until the Court conferred with its law clerks. Thus, it is readily apparent, even from an outdated globe such as that possessed by this Court, that Bolivia, a hemisphere away, ain't in south-central Texas, and that, at the very least, the District of Columbia is a more appropriate venue (though Bolivia isn't located there either). Furthermore, as this Judicial District bears no significant relationship to any of the matters at issue, and the judge of this Court simply loves cigars, the Plaintiff can be expected to suffer neither harm nor prejudice by a transfer to Washington, D.C., a Bench better able to rise to the smoky challenges presented by this case, despite the alleged and historic presence there of countless "smoke-filled" rooms. . . .

Mongoose on the Loose!

Langford v. Shu, 128 S.E.2d 210 (N.C. 1962)

With a whoosh and a screech, a furry object, which plaintiff believed to be an animal, sprang out at her. She jumped back and turned to run. She stumbled into a brick wall, tearing a cartilage in her knee. Plaintiff spent 63 days in the hospital,and incurred medical bills in the sum of $2,219.88.

Plaintiff, Mrs. Langford, sued her neighbor, Mrs. Shu. She had seen the wooden box labeled "Danger, African Mongoose, Live Snake Eater" when she came into the house through the back door, passing through a screened back porch. Langford discussed the box with Shu, who told her it was a mongoose and that it eats snakes and bugs.

Shu had two boys, aged nine and eleven. They overheard the conversation and decided they ought to demonstrate the box, which held a foxtail that flew out of the box by means of a spring.

The court held that Shu was liable for her sons' prank:

To reach any other conclusion would be to ignore the propensities of little boys who, since the memory of a man runneth not to the contrary, have delighted to stampede timorous ladies with snakes, bugs, lizards, mice and other rewarding small creatures which hold no terror for youngsters. It is implicit in this evidence that defendant expected to enjoy the joke on her neighbor as much as the children, and that she participated in the act with them. To say that she should not have expected one of the boys to spring ‘the mongoose‘ on plaintiff would strain credulity.
. . . .

Taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff the evidence would permit the jury to find that defendant approved and participated in the practical joke her children played on the plaintiff; that defendant knew plaintiff was afraid of snakes and of the contents of the box which defendant had told her contained a mongoose which ate live snakes; that in the exercise of due care defendant could have reasonably foreseen that if a furry object came hurtling from the box toward plaintiff she would become so frightened that she was likely to do herself some bodily harm in headlong flight.

Running in Church Not the Same as Being Hit by a Coconut At Zulu Parade at Mardi Gras

Bass v. Aetna Insurance Co., 370 So.2d 511 (La. 1979)

It was a revival service in church. Reverend Rodney Jeffers, preaching to the congregation of Shepard's Fold Church, stated that the doors of the church should be opened and referred to the possibility of “running.” Mr. Fussell, a member of the church, ran down the church aisle and collided with Mrs. Bass, a member of the church who was in the aisle praying because there weren't enough seats for everyone.

Fussell testified that he was “trotting” under the Spirit of the Lord and does not remember actually running into Mrs. Bass. But another witness testified that she saw Fussell run into Bass and knock her down. The Court said this didn't let Fussell off the hook: "A worshiper in church has no more right to run over a fellow worshiper in the aisle than a passerby on the sidewalk."

The Court specifically rejected the idea that this incident was an "Act of God" (a theory that is sometimes used as a defense to injury claims).

To complicate matters, Fussell was not running for himself but for Reverend Jeffers, so "said to open the doors, he felt like running and he didn't have room because of the crowd and would somebody please run for him.“

Because there had been no previous accidents, Bass did not assume the risk of injury. Bass had been in the church for 25 years and no one had ever run, nor had anyone been injured. Therefore, the Court was not persuaded "that she could or should have known or understood that she was incurring such a risk as, for example, in Schofield v. The Continental Insurance Co., 330 So.2d 376 (La.App.1976), where the spectator at a Zulu parade at Mardi Gras was hit by a coconut thrown from a float."

Next time you're in church and the preacher invites trotting, either sit down or keep your eyes open.

Riding into Court on a Jackrabbit

Smith v. Colonial Penn Insurance Co., 943 F. Supp. 782 (S.D. Tex. 1996).

This case involved a breach of contract based on an insurance policy. The insurance company moved to transfer venue. The fact that the nearest commercial airport was 40 miles away was not enough to warrant transfer.

In the opinion, the Court noted that Galveston does not have a commercial airport into which Defendant's representatives may fly and "out of which they may be expediently whisked to the federal courthouse in Galveston. Rather, Defendant contends that it will be faced with the huge 'inconvenience' of flying into Houston and driving less than forty miles to the Galveston courthouse, an act that will 'encumber' it with 'unnecessary driving time and expenses.'"

The Court said:

The Court, being somewhat familiar with the Northeast, notes that perceptions about travel are different in that part of the country than they are in Texas. A litigant in that part of the country could cross several states in a few hours and might be shocked at having to travel fifty miles to try a case, but in this vast state of Texas, such a travel distance would not be viewed with any surprise or consternation.

The Court quoted a saying: "The sun is 'rize, the sun is set, and we is still in Texas yet!" The Court then sought to educate the litigants concerning Texas:

Defendant should be assured that it is not embarking on a three-week-long trip via covered wagons when it travels to Galveston. Rather, Defendant will be pleased to discover that the highway is paved and lighted all the way to Galveston, and thanks to the efforts of this Court's predecessor, Judge Roy Bean, the trip should be free of rustlers, hooligans, or vicious varmints of unsavory kind. Moreover, the speed limit was recently increased to seventy miles per hour on most of the road leading to Galveston, so Defendant should be able to hurtle to justice at lightning speed. To assuage Defendant's worries about the inconvenience of the drive, the Court notes that Houston's Hobby Airport is located about equal drivetime from downtown Houston and the Galveston courthouse. Defendant will likely find it an easy, traffic-free ride to Galveston as compared to a congested, construction-riddled drive to downtown Houston. The Court notes that any inconvenience suffered in having to drive to Galveston may likely be offset by the peacefulness of the ride and the scenic beauty of the sunny isle.

The Court said, "it is not this Court's concern how Plaintiff gets here, whether it be by plane, train, automobile, horseback, foot, or on the back of a huge Texas jackrabbit, as long as Plaintiff is here at the proper date and time."

Hogging the Court's Resources

Texas Pig Stands, Inc. v. Hard Rock Cafe International, Inc., 951 F.2d 684 (5th Cir. 1992)

The Court had to "traverse the barbecue heartland of the South" to resolve the issue of which restaurant got to use the term "pig sandwich" to describe barbecued pig meat on a bun.

The judge was unable to resist titles like "This Little Piggy Went to Market," "Attorney Fees-Did the Court Go Hog Wild?" "Unjust Enrichment -- Did Hard Rock Bring Home the Bacon?" and at the end, "D-D-Dt-D-D-Dt That's All, Folks!

But the Court also acknowledged it could not "rush higgledy-piggy" into these meaty questions, and drew upon the 1930 case of Dixiepig Corp. v. Pig Stand Co., 31 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) to help resolve the issues.

Ultimately the court held that the term "pig sandwich" is protectable and capable of registration as a trademark.

"The Equipment"

Short v. Oig Beto Unit, 2008 WL 2074051 (E.D.Tex. 2008)

In his complaint, Short says that “the equipment” is causing him to suffer bodily injury in many ways, and putting him a state of mind that amounts to constant torture. He says that officers have told him that they are tired of how he is being treated by the equipment.

Short explains that the Office of the Inspector General at the Beto Unit has been monitoring him for years with a transmitter resistor, satellite wire, a “bug wire-tap,” using audio and video, with a “forensic ex-military cutting edge voice satellite,” which he says is an illegal black-market security system. He says that this amounts to an invasion of his privacy and he believes that the system is plugged into a computer.

Short says that he hears the voices of his family members in the air of his cell, and so he believes that the equipment has recorded their voices from their visits to him. He says that he has suffered seizures, migraines, and chest pains as a result of electrical impulses in the equipment and that he heard amplified noises. Short says that the equipment picks up conversations and thoughts, even when he is sleeping, and that it gives him nightmares because of “non-stop talking at close range in my ears while I sleep."

Tinnitus, perhaps?

The CIA and FBI are at it again!

Engle v. United States, 736 F. Supp. 670 (D. Md. 1989), aff'd 902 F.2d 28 (1998).

Shirley Engle alleged the CIA and FBI drugged and hypnotized her, placed electronic monitoring devices in her clothing, and even sneaked into her house at night to take blood from her arm. The chemicals they used on plaintiff caused "skin eruptions, itching, burns, numbness . . . ." (If the chemicals caused her to be numb, how does it itch and burn?)

Neither the CIA nor the FBI had any records on Shirley. The Court dismissed the case.

The Case That Could Not Be Lost. Or Won.

Lodi v. Lodi, 151 F.R.D. 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd, 41 F.3d 1500 (2d Cir. 1994)

The court was confronted with a claim by a man who sued himself for mismanaging his own trust fund. The litigant acted as his own lawyer, representing both sides on appeal. He lost below and on appeal. Affirming, the appellate court wrote:

In the circumstances, this result cannot be unfair to Mr. Lodi. Although it is true that, as plaintiff and appellant, he loses, it is equally true that, as defendant and respondent, he wins! It is hard to imagine a more even handed application of justice. Truly, it would appear that Oreste Lodi is that rare litigant who is assured of both victory and defeat regardless of which side triumphs.

The opinion was fair to Lodi, even as to the assessment of costs: “[E]ach party will bear his own costs."

Blackie the Talking Cat

Miles v. City Council of Augusta, Georgia, 551 F. Supp. 349 (S.D. Ga. 1982)

Carl and Elaine Miles challenged the authority of the City of Augusta to levy an occupation tax. They own "Blackie, The Talking Cat." Carl Miles had trained Blackie to speak several words and phrases of the English language. The City wanted to exact money for a business license because Carl and Elaine had solicited and accepted contributions from downtown pedestrians who wanted to hear the cat speak. Plaintiffs lived off the contributions received for Blackie's orations.

The Judge confessed that he had seen and heard a demonstration of Blackie's abilities:

The point in time of the Court's view was late summer, 1982, well after the events contended in this lawsuit. One afternoon when crossing Greene Street in an automobile, I spotted in the median a man accompanied by a cat and a woman. The black cat was draped over his left shoulder. Knowing the matter to be in litigation, and suspecting that the cat was Blackie, I thought twice before stopping. Observing, however, that counsel for neither side was present and that any citizen on the street could have happened by chance upon this scene, I spoke, and the man with the cat eagerly responded to my greeting. I asked him if his cat could talk. He said he could, and if I would pull over on the side street he would show me. I did, and he did. The cat was wearing a collar, two harnesses and a leash. Held and stroked by the man Blackie said “I love you” and “I want my Mama.” The man then explained that the cat was the sole source of income for him and his wife and requested a donation which was provided. I felt that my dollar was well spent. The cat was entertaining as was its owner. . . .

In a footnote, the Court also said:

For hundreds, perhaps thousands of years, people have carried on conversations with cats. Most often, these are one-sided and range from cloying, mawkish nonsense to topics of science and the liberal arts. Apparently Blackie's pride does not prevent him from making an occasional response to this great gush of human verbiage, much to the satisfaction and benefit of his “owners.” Apparently, some cats do talk. Others just grin.

Ultimately, Blackie's owners were required to get a license.

A name by any other name. Please.

Long-time reader, attorney Jody R. Nathan (almost a week!), contributed a list of her favorite case names and other miscellaneous decisions. Jody has an innate appreciation for symmetry and cheap laughs.

Bowlin v. Alley, 773 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1989)

Dyer v. Emergency, 91 P.3d 683 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004)

Taylor v. Inch, No. 09-3083 (10th Cir. 9/1/09)

Hamburger v. Fry, 338 P.2d 1088 (Okla. 1958)

Fairshter v. Stinky Love, Inc., No. 07-1424 (10th Cir. 12/23/08)

Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. of N.M. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 269 F.3d 1158, 1166-67 (10th Cir. 2001).

U.S. v. Friday, No. No. 06-8093 (10th Cir. 5/8/08) ("I knew there was a conspiracy; I'll bet Thursday's in on it!)

Spanx, Inc. v. Sexy Panties and Naughty Knickers, No. 08-CV-1375 (N.D. Ga. 4/9/08)

Maybe Jody is more judicial than one might suppose, because sometimes even the courts cannot resist the temptation to comment on an interesting case title. For example, in Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises, 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), the court commented at fn. 1:

"Thus, this most delightful of case names: Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children v. Playboy Enterprises; seriously rivaled, in our judgment, only by United States v. 11 1/4 Dozen Packages of Article Labeled in Part Mrs. Moffat's Shoo Fly Powders for Drunkenness, 40 F.Supp. 208 (W.D.N.Y.1941) (condemnation proceeding under Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act), and United States ex rel. Mayo v. Satan and his Staff, 54 F.R.D. 282 (W.D.Pa.1971) (leave to proceed in forma pauperis denied in view of questions of personal jurisdiction over defendants)."

The Mayo case is famous because the plaintiff sued Satan and his servants. "He alleges that Satan has on numerous occasions caused plaintiff misery and unwarranted threats, against the will of plaintiff, that Satan has placed deliberate obstacles in his path and has caused plaintiff's downfall." This was going to be a class action, but the court dismissed it because plaintiff failed to include instructions for service of process.

To round things out, Jody provides the following citation to a case that was unable to achieve membership in the list because the court wouldn't allow a name change:

Knox v. Bland, No. 10-7066 (10th Cir. 2/14/11) ("Antone L. Knox, an inmate at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary in McAlester, Oklahoma, brings this pro se civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against eight Oklahoma state judges. His claims arise out of his unsuccessful attempts in state court to have his name changed for religious reasons to Ali Ishmael Mandingo Warrior Chief.")

I can't resist adding a few of my own:

United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef etc., 726 F.2d 1481

United States v. Approximately 64,695 Pounds of Shark Fins, 520 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2008)

United States v. 2,507 Live Canary Winged Parakeets, 689 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D. Fla. 1988)

United States v. One Lucite Ball Containing Lunar Material (One Moon Rock) and One Ten Inch by Fourteen Inch Wooden Plaque, 235 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (S.D. Fla. 2003)

United States v. Article Consisting of 50,000 Cardboard Boxes More or Less, Each Containing One Pair of Clacker Balls, 413 F. Supp. 1281 (D. Wisconsin 1976).

Plough v. Fields, 422 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1970)

Silver v. Gold, 211 Cal. App. 3d 17, 259 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1989)

Death v. Graves, CGC-06-451316 (San Francisco Super. Ct., filed April 17, 2006)

United States v. Bad Marriage, 439 F.3d 534 (9th Cir. 2005)

Bug O'Buckets

Jackson v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 4:01cv00137E(J) (N.D. Okla. 11/9/01)

"On a hot, steamy evening on July 21, 1996, Plaintiff Richard Jackson was at his Tulsa home relaxing after a day of working in his own landscaping business known as “Yard Guard.” His wife Wanda had left to go play bingo around 5:00 p.m. and was not expected back right away. Around 8:00 p.m., Plaintiff had stripped naked and was reclining on top of his bed watching T.V., and drifting off to sleep. An electrical thunderstorm moved into the area.

"He awoke with a start around 9:00 p.m. to notice the T.V. and all lights had gone off. He got up from the bed and found a cigarette lighter. Plaintiff noticed his wife's “Bug O'Bucket” citronella candle sitting just inside the front door. Although he had traditional indoor candles and a flashlight in his house, Plaintiff chose to light the “Bug O' Bucket,” which according to the label, is intended for outdoor use only. With disregard for the contents of the label, Plaintiff carried the burning “Bug O'Bucket” candle through the house checking his circuit breaker boxes. He placed the bucket on the floor near the back door of his house and went outside, naked, in the rain to check an outdoor breaker box. He was not successful with the breakers and came back inside soaking wet. He carried the bucket back through the house and placed it near the front door, which was propped open. The electricity came back on. The power had been out only 15-20 minutes.

"Plaintiff grabbed a towel to dry himself off and leaned over the bucket on the floor to snuff out the flame with his fingers. Plaintiff claims when he leaned over, water either dripped off his body or the towel and into the bucket. He then claims an explosion of hot wax erupted over his torso and genitals. He further claims his wife came home right at that moment to find her naked husband lying backwards on his bed and in pain. She attended to his bums, and extinguished the candle by simply blowing it out.

"Plaintiff went to the doctor the next day and was placed on a 10-day regiment of outpatient treatment at the burn unit. Plaintiff claims he sustained permanent scarring and numbness to the tip of his penis. He also claims he has a diminished desire for sexual relations with his wife, compared to before. He further claims the explosion of hot wax caused damages to his hardwood floors and ceiling."

Plaintiff sued Candle corp., which manufactured "Bug O'Bucket." There was no proof the product was defective. The case was dismissed. The moral of the story is simple. Don't go around naked carrying a bucket of hot wax in a thunderstorm, but if you have to, don't stand over it and drip.

Breakfast Trickery

Sugawara v. Pepsico, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43127 (E.D. Cal. 2009)

Plaintiff filed a class action for fraud against the manufacturer of "Cap'n Crunch with Crunchberries Cereal" because there was no fruit in the cereal.

"In addition to the use of the word "berries" in the Product name, the Product's principal display panel ("PDP"), the portion of the Product box designed to face consumers as they shop in a market aisle, features the Product's namesake, "Cap'n Crunch" thrusting a spoonful of "Crunchberries" at the prospective buyer.

"The Crunchberries are pieces of cereal in bright fruit colors, shaped to resemble berries. While close inspection reveals that the Crunchberries on the PDP are not really berries, Plaintiff contends that the colorful Crunchberries, combined with use of the word "berry" in the Product name, convey the message that Cap'n Crunch is not all sugar and starch, but contains redeeming fruit. This message is allegedly supplemented and reinforced by additional marketing that represents that "Crunch Berries is a combination of Crunch biscuits and colorful red, purple, teal and green berries."

The case was easy decide, because the court just didn't believe plaintiff had been deceived:

"In actuality, the Product contains no berries of any kind. If the consumer takes the box from the shelf and examines the fine print of the ingredient list, he or she will discover that the only fruit content is a touch of strawberry fruit concentrate, twelfth in order on the ingredient list."

In dismissing the case, the Court noted that "while the challenged packaging contains the word "berries" it does so only in conjunction with the descriptive term "crunch." This Court is not aware of, nor has Plaintiff alleged the existence of, any actual fruit referred to as a "crunchberry." Furthermore, the "Crunchberries" depicted on the PDP are round, crunchy, brightly-colored cereal balls, and the PDP clearly states both that the Product contains "sweetened corn & oat cereal" and that the cereal is "enlarged to show texture." Thus, a reasonable consumer would not be deceived into believing that the Product in the instant case contained a fruit that does not exist."

The court also said that "The survival of the instant claim would require this Court to ignore all concepts of personal responsibility and common sense. The Court has no intention of allowing that to happen."

Shocking and Electrifying

Williamson v. Haynes Best Western, 688 So.2d 1201 (La. App. 1997)

Sonya Williamson claimed she was electrocuted while attempting to turn off the light in her hotel room at the Haynes Best Western Hotel, where she was living with her family. This incident, according to Sonya, caused her to be a quadriplegic.

The court didn't believe it. For one thing, Sonya had no burns on her body and no entrance or exit wound. Several witnesses saw Sonya strolling around after the alleged incident and driving various vehicles. A housekeeper said that Sonya was sitting in the lobby watching television the day after the alleged accident. Sonya's sister talked to her after the "electrocution" and did not detect anything abnormal. Sonya did not mention the electrocution accident.

The Williamsons had a history of 48 suspicious claims. In one of these incidents, Sonya and the family maid (who was also, from time to time, alleged to be a “roustabout” for the family business) were allegedly shocked in an unwitnessed accident when a CB antenna contacted an overhead power line. Sonya developed quadriplegic symptoms similar to those observed after the incident that was the subject of this litigation.

It seems that when the family was low on cash, one of them would fall down the stairs, fall off a horse, be run down by a horse, run the car off the road, fall in to a hole, or get electrocuted. Insurance claims followed these incidents. Williamson's mother had a similar electrocution earlier. The accidents were apparently staged, with different family members playing different roles as victim, driver, etc. To keep these complicated electrical facts straight, the Court dubbed the incidents "Electrocution I," "Electrocution II," and "Electrocution III."

The jury found that the incident was fraudulent or staged and rendered a verdict for the hotel.

Flyspeckin'

Hyperphase Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp, No. 02-C-647-C (W.D. Wis. July 1, 2003)

Court rules permit electronic documents to be e-filed until midnight on the due date. Microsoft electronically filed a motion at 12:04:27 AM (4 minutes and 27 seconds late). The opposing party Hyperphase Technologies, Inc. filed a motion to strike the motion as untimely. The court entered the following order:

"In a scandalous affront to this court's deadlines, Microsoft did not file its summary judgment motion until 12:04:27 a.m .... I don't know this personally because I was home sleeping, but that's what the court's computer docketing program says, so I'll accept it as true.

"Microsoft's insouciance so flustered Hyperphase that nine of its attorneys [names omitted] promptly filed a motion to strike .... Counsel used bolded italics to make their point, a clear sign of grievous inequity by one's foe. True, this court did enter an order ... ordering the parties not to flyspeck each other, but how could such an order apply to a motion filed almost five minutes later? Microsoft's temerity was nothing short of a frontal assault on the precept of punctuality so cherished by and vital to this court.

"Wounded though this court may be by Microsoft's four minute and twenty-seven second dereliction in duty, it will transcend the affront and forgive the tardiness. Indeed, to demonstrate the evenhandedness of its magnanimity, the court will allow Hyperphase on some future occasion in this case to efile a motion four minutes and thirty seconds late ...."

About This Blog

If you've ever had to deal with lawyers, you know that many are stuffy. That's putting it mildly. Who uses "wherefore," "heretofore," "whereas" and "res ipsa loquitur" in normal conversations? But Lawyers are veritable cut-ups compared to the courts. Courts and judges are so solemn that facial expressions by trial participants are sometimes expressly banned from the courtroom. That means you could go to jail for smiling.

Exceptions exist, and that's what this blog is about.

I'm retired and not reading as many cases as I did once upon a time. I may keep this going, but probably not, as my interests have changed since this was written 13 years ago.